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Zoonotic influenza viruses circulating in poultry and swinepose an ever present threat to human health. In particular, the
rapid geographical expansion of highly pathogenic avian influ-
enza (HPAI) A(H5N1) throughout Asia and then into Europe, the
Middle East, and Africa during the 2000s galvanized the global
community in an attempt to control this rapidly growing threat.
Despite successful control efforts in some countries, the virus re-
mains endemic in poultry in at least six countries and continues to
cause human illness and deaths as well as countless outbreaks in
birds. During the past decade, 668 cases and 393 deaths were de-
tected and reported to the World Health Organization (WHO)
(1). During the 17 years since human infections with HPAI
A(H5N1) were first identified in Hong Kong, Special Administra-
tive Region, People’s Republic of China, in 1997, these viruses
have evolved substantially through mutation and reassortment,
resulting in multiple divergent genotypes and clades (2).
Ongoing H5N1 circulation has appropriately resulted in a fo-
cus on sequencing viral genomes to understand the evolution of
these viruses and the significance of observed genetic changes.
Expanded laboratory capacity for high-throughput Sanger se-
quencing and recent technological advances, such as next-
generation sequencing and parallel computing, have revolution-
ized the quantity, quality, and availability of gene sequences and
our ability to quickly and accurately analyze these data (3). Con-
sequently, the number of animal and human influenza virus se-
quences available in publically accessible databases has dramati-
cally increased over the years, as have the bioinformatics tools
required for efficient investigation (4, 5). These advances in labo-
ratory and analytical methods provide strong incentives to utilize
molecular data for pandemic risk assessment of zoonotic influ-
enza viruses at the animal-human interface (6).
However, examination of influenza sequence data alone does
not allow us to assess the pandemic potential of a virus. Pandemic
risk assessment that utilizes sequence data can take place only after
critical genetic signatures are identified through laboratory re-
search into the consequences for relevant biological properties (or
phenotypes). These critical genetic features include those that
based on previous experimental validation are predicted to confer
virulence and/or have the ability to transmit efficiently in mam-
mals. In this context, genomes are sequenced, mutations are de-
tected relative to earlier viruses and prototype strains, significance
is appraised based on prior knowledge of genetic markers, and
phenotypes are tested using a variety of in vitro and in vivo exper-
iments. Viruses possessing phenotypes of interest or concern of-
ten become candidates for reverse-genetics studies, which are es-
sential to elucidate the precise molecular correlate(s) of a given
phenotype (Fig. 1). From a molecular epidemiological perspec-
tive, this process is at the heart of how the public health commu-
nity makes informed decisions about the threat posed by zoonotic
influenza viruses and which interventions might be most effective
(7).
Laboratories worldwide have employed reverse genetics to
study the mechanisms by which HPAI H5N1 and other zoonotic
influenza viruses evolve and how these mechanisms influence host
receptor specificity, antigenic variation, replication, pathogenesis,
drug susceptibility, and transmission (8–11). Besides being used
to create vaccine viruses for the development of live, attenuated
(12) and inactivated prepandemic H5N1 influenza vaccines (13),
reverse-genetics methodologies also have been used for many
years to study the phenotypic consequences of particular muta-
tions, including genetic changes that confer a gain of function
(GOF). Influenza virus GOF studies have focused on several re-
search areas: in vitro and/or in vivo replication in mammalian cell
culture or animal hosts, adaptive mutations conferring changes in
host susceptibility, alteration of receptor binding profiles and/or
tropism for mammalian airway tissues, enhanced polymerase ac-
tivity, changes in host antiviral response (e.g., cell signaling path-
ways), susceptibility to antiviral drugs, and pathogenesis and/or
transmissibility in mammalian animal models. Such GOF exper-
iments have elucidated key biological principles and provided the
scientific basis for genomic sequence-based risk assessment of
zoonotic viruses with pandemic potential. For example, the mo-
lecular basis for avian versus mammalian influenza virus receptor
binding (2,3 versus 2,6 sialylated glycans) has been elucidated
largely through GOF experiments, and some recent studies that
identified specific HA mutations conferring a switch from avian to
mammalian host receptor specificity also demonstrated the im-
pact of these mutations on the ability of H5N1 virus to more
efficiently infect the human upper respiratory tract (14–19). Mu-
tations conferring enhanced virulence in mammalian models or
inhibition of the host antiviral response with the potential to cause
more serious human illness have been described in other studies
(20–22). Still other GOF work characterized mutations that con-
fer resistance to neuraminidase (NA) inhibitors (23–26). These
data are critical to make effective drug treatment decisions and to
inform stockpiling of antiviral medications. Finally, many publi-
cations have described mutations that confer adaptation of H5N1
viruses to mammalian hosts and transmissibility in guinea pigs or
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ferrets (19, 24, 27). It should be noted that in many cases, this
research can demonstrate loss of function, which is also valuable
for risk assessment. These types of studies provide vital data with
which to monitor circulating viruses for features that may suggest
increased capability for human-to-human transmission or more
long-term adaptation of H5N1 viruses in humans or other mam-
malian hosts, such as pigs.
Reverse-genetics experiments using the well-established ferret
model to measure H5N1 respiratory droplet-mediated transmis-
sion were, until recently, unable to identify specific mutations
involved in this process because the laboratory-derived viruses,
like their wild-type counterparts, demonstrated a lack of or lim-
ited capacity for aerosol transmission (18,19, 28). However, stud-
ies from 2012 by Herfst et al. (29) and Imai et al. (21) were able to
demonstrate that genetically modified H5N1 viruses could be
transmitted relatively efficiently via respiratory droplets in a
mammalian host following acquisition of specific mutations in
the hemagglutinin (HA) and/or in combination with the presence
of lysine at position 627 in the PB2 protein sequence. The contro-
versy sparked by these studies continues to reverberate (21, 29).
Some have argued that benefits associated with H5N1 GOF trans-
mission studies outweigh the risks (30–32), while others have
stated that public health derived little to no benefit to justify the
research (33–35).
Some GOF research resumed following the end of a voluntary
global moratorium (36). However, a new moratorium on funding
certain types of GOF research on influenza, severe acute respira-
tory syndrome (SARS), and Middle East respiratory syndrome
(MERS) viruses is now in place in the United States (37). This
pause provided an opportune time to describe how the molecular
markers identified by the controversial ferret transmission studies
and many other GOF studies have provided important informa-
tion for public health risk assessment of naturally occurring vi-
ruses detected in animals and humans. Here we outline how we
utilize a molecularly based surveillance approach focused on
knowledge and insights gained from GOF research to inform in-
fluenza pandemic risk assessment, as well as risk management and
pandemic preparedness. We present the dramatic increase in the
number of human cases caused by HPAI H5N1 in Cambodia and
an outbreak of influenza A(H7N9) in China during 2013 as exam-
ples of how the results of GOF studies supported a more rapid and
accurate risk assessment and response to these situations. In both
instances, molecularly based surveillance identified naturally oc-
curring mutations in avian influenza viruses isolated from hu-
mans that had been demonstrated by GOF studies to increase
transmissibility in the ferret model, prompting the public health
actions described below.
To keep up with the large body of data from H5N1 GOF pub-
lications, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
in collaboration with domestic and international researchers
compiled published amino acid mutations and protein motifs that
were tested experimentally and shown to alter relevant functional
aspects of H5N1 virus phenotypes in the H5N1 Genetic Changes
Inventory (38). While this type of data had been used at CDC for
many years to conduct molecularly based surveillance of naturally
occurring influenza viruses, the end result of the H5N1 Genetic
FIG 1 H5N1 or other influenza A virus molecular-based surveillance, gain-of-function research, and pandemic preparedness decision making.
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Changes Inventory was to provide a single point of reference to
facilitate the efficient identification of specific mutations or motifs
in viral proteins that might signal adaptation to mammalian spe-
cies, changes in susceptibility to antiviral medications, or changes
in viral pathogenesis and transmissibility. By focusing on muta-
tions specifically identified as conferring GOF phenotypes, veter-
inary and public health experts have used the Genetic Changes
Inventory to help assess the relevance of molecular markers iden-
tified in naturally occurring viruses. During pandemic risk assess-
ment, viral sequence data are weighed with respect to other viro-
logic and epidemiological traits of a newly identified virus.
Results from more than 15 years of H5N1 GOF studies were
compiled to assist researchers at institutions worldwide in their
risk assessment of naturally occurring influenza viruses to facili-
tate an early response in the face of emerging zoonotic influenza
virus threats. Individuals or institutions tasked with risk assess-
ment and pandemic planning must weigh the significance of the
mutations detected via molecular surveillance. For example, mu-
tations associated with some human H5N1 fatalities (e.g., PB2
627K) (39, 40) may carry more weight than those found to en-
hance virulence only in a mouse model (e.g., the presence of the
NS1 PDZ binding domain motif) (41). Similarly, mutations pre-
viously found to alter the receptor-binding preferences of H5N1
viruses from an 2,3 (avian) to 2,6 (human) preference would be
of particular concern. Of greater concern would be the identifica-
tion of mutations associated with enhanced mammalian trans-
missibility, including the specific amino acid residue combina-
tions identified by Herfst et al. and Imai et al. to confer H5N1
respiratory droplet transmission in ferrets (21, 29).
A recent instance of enhanced surveillance and response by the
CDC and regional partners occurred following the abrupt rise in
human cases of H5N1 that occurred in Cambodia in 2013. At the
same time that increased case numbers were detected, public se-
quence database mining by researchers identified viruses from
several 2013 human infections that possessed the same mutations
shown by GOF studies to alter receptor-binding specificity toward
an 2,6 preference (K189R and Q222L) and enhanced respiratory
droplet transmission of a clade 1 virus in ferrets (N220K with
Q222L) (42). Additional amino acid sequence comparisons of
these viruses to those of previously circulating Cambodian clade 1
viruses revealed three other HA substitutions conserved in all
2013 viruses. These three mutations were also shown by GOF
experiments to increase binding of H5 viruses to mammalian host
cell sialic acid receptors in 2,6 linkage either alone (S133A and
S155N) or in combination with other mutations (S123P) (43–45).
These sequence findings directly led the CDC to dispatch a team of
three subject matter experts to Cambodia to conduct an epidemi-
ological investigation of sources of exposure to poultry for these
human cases, case contact trace-back, including serologic analysis
for H5 antibody, and retrospective investigations of poultry
deaths and outbreaks in locations where cases were discovered. In
addition, an intensive effort was undertaken to consolidate and
analyze human and animal epidemiological and sequence data
through collaboration across public health and veterinary sectors,
as well as local, regional, and global agencies (42). Although com-
parisons of the viral genomes of poultry and environmental sam-
ples to human samples demonstrated that the K189R, N220K, and
Q222L mutations (i) were absent in poultry viruses, (ii) were likely
to have arisen during human infection, and (iii) did not transmit
from person to person, the enhanced surveillance, improved lab-
oratory capacity, and financial resources that resulted from this
investigation highlight the utility of GOF data for pandemic pre-
paredness (42). Because of the finding that these GOF mutations
likely occurred during replication in humans and the possibility
that they might arise again, a candidate vaccine virus (CVV) was
developed against A/Cambodia/X0810301/2013, the virus that
possessed two of the markers described by Imai et al. as enhancing
ferret aerosol transmission and three mutations shown to alter
avian receptor-binding specificity (21, 46). While a vaccine stock-
pile was not manufactured using this particular CVV, having a
vaccine virus available that has been developed for human use and
excluded from Select Agent Regulations reduces the time required
for vaccine development and testing by at least 1 month, thus
enhancing global pandemic preparedness. This reduction in the
time required for vaccine development is the basis for the creation
of a library of CVVs for emerging influenza pandemic threats, an
approach taken by WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Re-
sponse System for many years (46).
Due to the continuous evolution and antigenic drift detected in
many subtypes of avian and swine influenza viruses, prioritization
of CVV development is required. To meet this need and prioritize
other research decisions, the Influenza Risk Assessment Tool
(IRAT) was developed by the Influenza Division at the CDC to-
gether with a global consortium of animal and public health ex-
perts to offer a standardized set of considerations to be applied
when evaluating viruses with pandemic potential (47). The tool
uses an additive model, based on multiattribute decision analysis,
to integrate weighted elements from both laboratory and field
observations. Collectively, assessment of the molecular character-
istics of circulating virus, together with factors such as incidence of
human infections, population immunity, geographic or host dis-
tribution, antigenic variation, and/or extent of overall genetic di-
versification, provides an objective approach to measuring poten-
tial risk of a given strain, subtype, or group of viruses (47).
The recent emergence of low-pathogenicity avian influenza
(LPAI) H7N9 virus causing human infections in China, like the
emergence of pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus in 2009, was
instructive from a molecular surveillance perspective because the
HA and neuraminidase (NA) genes were not closely related to
those of previously recognized influenza A viruses (48). Despite
the lack of high sequence identity of this H7N9 virus to other
known viruses, many structural and functional motifs between
this LPAI H7N9 and HPAI H5N1 viruses remain conserved, par-
ticularly the amino acid domains making up the three major
structural elements of the receptor binding site (RBS) (49). In
addition, NA enzymatic active sites, which are targets of NA in-
hibitors, share homology with NA proteins from H5N1 and other
influenza A subtype viruses (48). Finally, the internal genes de-
scribed for H7N9 viruses share common ancestry with H9N2 lin-
eage viruses, ancestry that is retained in the internal genes of many
H5N1 genotypes. Thus, many of the GOF mutations described for
both surface and internal protein sequences of H5N1 viruses were
assessed in the context of H7N9 virus sequences as they were de-
posited in databases during the early wave of human infections in
China.
Within hours of the posting of the H7N9 sequence data, CDC
and other investigators using the H5N1 Genetic Changes Inven-
tory identified several of the mutations described previously in H5
viruses shown to possess GOF phenotypes, such as increased re-
spiratory droplet transmission in ferrets (using H5 numbering:
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HA T156A and HA Q222L), mammalian host adaptation (PB2
E627K and PB2 D701N), and enhanced virulence in mice (M1
N30D and M1 T215A) (48, 50). Early detection of these molecular
markers in H7N9 viruses isolated from humans gave public health
authorities evidence that these viruses posed an immediate pan-
demic threat. Based on H7N9 sequence data alone, development
of a candidate vaccine virus began within a day using synthetic
biology (51). H7N9 viruses obtained from human cases in China
were subsequently shared with international partners within
2 weeks so that additional virologic characterization could be per-
formed. Over a period of approximately 8 to 10 weeks from the
initial reports of human infection, numerous laboratories identi-
fied H7N9 viruses (and the responsible mutations) with binding
affinity to 2,6 host cell receptors (48, 52), replication without
prior adaptation in mouse and ferret models (52), limited respi-
ratory droplet transmission in ferrets (52), and reduced suscepti-
bility to antiviral drugs (53), all substantiating inferences obtained
from molecularly based surveillance using knowledge gained from
GOF studies. The IRAT was used, as data accumulated, to assess
and reassess the risk posed by H7N9 viruses compared with other
zoonotic influenza viruses, and it was determined that the risk was
greater than for H5N1 subtype viruses. More recently, GOF stud-
ies have focused specifically on H7N9 viruses and have identified
other mutations (i.e., PB2 K526R) associated with enhanced
mammalian replication (54). Researchers also assessed the anti-
genic relationships of the novel viruses with existing H7 prepan-
demic vaccine candidates. These collective virologic findings,
along with the molecular markers identified, led WHO Collabo-
rating Centers for Influenza and vaccine manufacturers to rapidly
develop candidate vaccine viruses (55) and then led the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services to perform human clinical
trials (56) and to stockpile H7N9 vaccine in the United States (57)
for pandemic preparedness, shaving months off the time required
to deploy this vaccine, should it be needed.
As coordination of international surveillance activities and
global sharing of viruses improve (especially in the wake of the
2009 pandemic and emergence of H7N9 viruses in China), mo-
lecularly based surveillance has great potential for rapid risk as-
sessment of samples collected as part of active and passive surveil-
lance systems. Real-time feedback to investigators in the field or
authorities making policy decisions related to poultry outbreak
containment, clinical intervention, and diagnostic methodology,
to cite a few examples, will remain critical in the future. In addi-
tion, as building laboratory capacity is prioritized in countries
impacted the most by endemic H5N1 virus circulation and the
higher incidence of human infection, the ability to screen viruses
for amino acid markers or lineage-associated molecular determi-
nants by sequencing, pyrosequencing, mass spectrometry, and
real-time reverse transcription (RT)-PCR assays will become the
reality for more and more laboratories.
In recent years, both the range and speed of molecular surveil-
lance for H5N1 and other avian influenza viruses have continued
to improve. Notwithstanding, GOF studies are needed to inform
our interpretation of genetic data obtained from naturally occur-
ring viruses. Despite recent gains in our understanding of the mo-
lecular basis for phenotypic properties of HPAI H5N1 and LPAI
H7N9 viruses, more data are required to fully elucidate the mech-
anisms by which influenza viruses with pandemic potential cause
severe disease and how they evolve during replication in mamma-
lian hosts. This is especially true for studies that offer insight into
the virologic and molecular changes associated with increased ca-
pacity for mammalian transmission, a hallmark of pandemic in-
fluenza viruses. As outlined above, GOF studies have provided
critical information for molecularly based surveillance, as well as
for research groups sequencing, characterizing, or experimentally
testing these viruses. Besides answering fundamental questions
about the molecular basis for key phenotypic characteristics of
H5N1 and other avian influenza viruses, GOF data have been used
to launch outbreak investigations and allocate resources (e.g.,
H5N1 in Cambodia), to develop criteria for the Influenza Risk
Assessment Tool, and to make difficult and sometimes costly pan-
demic planning policy decisions, such as preparing CVVs and
purchasing prepandemic vaccine stockpiles (e.g., H7N9 in
China). The detection of GOF mutations in HPAI H5N1 and LPAI
H7N9 viruses prompted immediate public health responses that
differed from the actions that would have occurred with a rise in
case numbers alone because concurrent detection of GOF muta-
tions with an increase in human cases could be a signal that
human-to-human transmission had begun, a situation where
rapid response is paramount. By coupling results obtained from
GOF studies with enhanced surveillance and preparedness, we as a
community of scientists, veterinary and public health experts, reg-
ulators, and policy advisers have an opportunity to use the most
advanced methodologies available to address the continuing
threat posed by influenza viruses with pandemic potential.
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